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Abstract
Between 1964 and 1990, the notion of nonlocality in Bell’s papers un-
derwent a profound change as his nonlocality theorem gradually became
detached from quantum mechanics, and referred to wider probabilistic
theories involving correlations between separated beables. The proposi-
tion that standard quantum mechanics is itself nonlocal (more precisely,
that it violates ‘local causality’) became divorced from the Bell theorem
per se from 1976 on, although this important point is widely overlooked
in the literature. In 1990, the year of his death, Bell would express serious
misgivings about the mathematical form of the local causality condition,
and leave ill-defined the issue of the consistency between special relativity
and violation of the Bell-type inequality. In our view, the significance of
the Bell theorem, both in its deterministic and stochastic forms, can only
be fully understood by taking into account the fact that a fully Lorentz-
covariant version of quantum theory, free of action-at-a-distance, can be
articulated in the Everett interpretation.
1 Introduction
John S. Bell’s last word on his celebrated nonlocality theorem and its interpre-
tation appeared in his ? paper ‘La nouvelle cuisine’, first published in the year
of his untimely death. Bell was careful here to distinguish between the issue of
‘no-superluminal-signalling’ in quantum theory (both quantum field theory and
quantum mechanics) and a principle he first introduced explicitly in 1976 and
called ‘local causality’ (?). In relation to the former, Bell expressed concerns
that amplify doubts he had already expressed in 1976. These concerns touch on
what is now widely known as the no-signalling theorem in quantum mechanics,
and ultimately have to do with Bell’s distaste for what he saw as an anthro-
pocentric element in orthodox quantum thinking. In relation to local causality,
Bell emphasised that his famous factorizability (no-correlations) condition is not
to be seen ‘as the formulation of local causality, but as a consequence thereof’,
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and stressed how difficult he found it to articulate this consequence. He left
the question of any strict inconsistency between violation of factorizability and
special relativity theory unresolved, a not insignificant shift from his thinking
up to the early 1980s. Bell felt strongly that correlations ought always to be
apt for causal explanations—a view commonly attributed to the philosopher
Hans Reichenbach (though perhaps in this particular context incorrectly—of
which more below). But he recommended that factorizability ‘be viewed with
the utmost suspicion’.
Few if any commentators have remarked on this late ambivalence about the
factorizability condition on Bell’s part. Part of the problem facing him was,
as he himself emphasised, that although the intuition behind local causality
was based on the notion of cause, factorizability makes no reference to causes.
Whatever else was bothering Bell, apart from the absence of a clear-cut rel-
ativistic motivation, is perhaps a matter of speculation. We suggest, at any
rate, that there is an important difference between the notion of locality he
introduced in his original 1964 theorem and that of local causality. The differ-
ence is essentially that in 1964 he was excluding a certain kind of instantaneous
action-at-a-distance, whereas the connection between local causality and such
exclusion is not straightforward. More bluntly, and counter-intuitively: viola-
tion of local casuality does not necessarily imply action-at-a-distance. The issue
is model-dependent. There is a consistent Lorentz covariant model of quantum
phenomena which violates local causality but is local in Bell’s 1964 sense: the
Everett picture. One of the themes of our paper is something that Bell himself
emphasised, namely, the consideration of detailed physical models is especially
important in correcting wayward intuitions.
The importance of the distinction between Bell’s 1964 and 1976 versions
of his nonlocality theorem has been noted in the literature, particularly in the
recent careful work of Wiseman (?; see also ?). But in the present paper we
are more concerned with the notion of nonlocality than with the theorems per
se; appreciation of the changing face of nonlocality in Bell’s writings, and its
wider significance in the foundations of quantum mechanics, is harder to find
in the literature. In fact, there are categorical claims that Bell’s understanding
of nonlocality never underwent significant revision.1 We think this unlikely,
but more importantly, we wish to concentrate on how the 1964 and post-1976
notions of nonlocality should be understood.
The change in Bell’s definition of locality was accompanied by a shift of
thinking on his part and that of many other commentators from the 1970s on-
wards, in relation to the range of applicability of the Bell theorem. Originally
confined to deterministic hidden variable interpretations of quantum mechanics,
the theorem was later correctly seen to apply to probabilistic theories generally.
Thus it is a widely held view in the literature today that as a result of the
predicted (and experimentally corroborated) violation of Bell-type inequalities,
standard quantum mechanics itself is nonlocal.2 And yet, as Bell himself ac-
1See e.g. ?, ?, and ? for further discussion.
2Consider the following statements in the recent physics literature that arguably are rep-
resentative of a widespread view concerning the significance of the Bell nonlocality theorem.
The first appears in a lengthy 2013 paper by A. Hobson on the nature of quantum reality
in the American Journal of Physics: ‘Violation of Bell’s inequality shows that the [entan-
gled state]...is, indeed, nonlocal in a way that cannot be interpreted classically.’ (?, p.220)
In his reply to critics, Hobson writes: ‘This violation [of the Bell inequality] means that the
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knowledged, the proof that standard quantum mechanics violates local causality
need not rest on the Bell theorem—or even entanglement. A proof is possible
which is closely related to Einstein’s pre-1935 argument for nonlocality in quan-
tum mechanics.
We will attempt to spell these points out in more detail below by analysing
the development of Bell’s remarkable work from 1964 to 1990, and discussing
the relevance of the modern Everettian stance on nonlocality.
2 The original 1964 theorem: Lessons of the de
Broglie–Bohm theory
The original version of Bell’s nonlocality theorem was the fruit of a penetrat-
ing review of deterministic hidden variable theories published in ?, regrettably
several years after it had been submitted for publication.3 Bell achieved many
things in this paper, not all of which have been duly recognised. In particu-
lar, there is still insufficient appreciation in the literature that in this paper,
Bell was the first to prove the impossibility of non-contextual hidden variable
theories, and that his interpretation of this result was the polar opposite to
that of Simon B. Kochen and Ernst Specker, who independently and famously
published a finitist, but much more complicated version of the proof in ?. As
Bell saw it, what he had shown was that a fragment of the contextualism built
into the de Broglie–Bohm (pilot wave) hidden variable theory has to be found
in any deterministic hidden variable theory consistent with the (at least state-
independent) predictions of quantum mechanics, and that this is all well and
good. In contrast, Kochen and Specker thought they had actually ruled out
all hidden variable theories!4 Another interesting feature of Bell’s thinking is
this. Although he did not use the result in his simple version of the proof of the
Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem, Bell realised that Gleason’s theorem (?), and in
particular its corollary concerning the continuity of frame functions on Hilbert
spaces, ruled out non-contextualist hidden variable theories for most quantum
systems. What Bell did not suspect in 1964, even so, was that the Gleason
theorem could also be used to derive a nonlocality theorem for correlated spin-1
systems involving no inequalities.5
correlations are too tightly dependent on the non-local phase relationship between the two
[entangled] systems to be explainable by purely local means. So such correlations do lead to
nonlocality as a characteristic quantum phenomenon.’ (?, pp.710–711).
The final quote is the opening sentence in an extensive 2014 multi-authored paper on Bell
nonlocality in Reviews of Modern Physics: ‘In 1964, Bell proved that the predictions of
quantum theory are incompatible with those of any physical theory satisfying a natural notion
of locality.’ (?, p.420) In fact, Bell did no such thing in 1964; his original version of the theorem
refers only to deterministic hidden variable theories of quantum mechanics (see below). The
definition of locality that the authors of the 2014 review paper actually give reflects that found
in Bell’s later papers, where determinism is no longer involved.
3For further details see ?.
4See ? and ?.
5See ?, ?, ? and ?. The Heywood-Redhead and Stairs results predate Greenberger-Horne-
Zeilinger (?) in terms of providing a Bell theorem with no inequalities, though this is widely
overlooked in the literature; for example ? footnote 35, and ? make no reference to these early
spin-1 theorems. In the case of bipartite systems, the tight connection between contextualism
and nonlocality means that the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem raises a prima facie consistency
problem for the very assumptions in the original 1964 Bell theorem as applied to quantum
mechanics. To see how nonetheless consistency is assured, see ?.
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But for our present purposes, the relevant question that Bell raised in his
review paper was whether the action-at-a-distance built into the ? Bohm pilot
wave theory was characteristic of all hidden variable theories. As Bell noted,
in the Bohm theory, in the case of measurements on a pair of separated en-
tangled systems, ‘the disposition of one piece of apparatus affects the results
obtained with a distant piece’. Part of the answer to the question was provided
in Bell’s 1964 paper, amusingly published two years earlier. (Advocates of the
retrocausal ‘free will’ loophole take heart.) Bell showed that any deterministic
theory in which the hidden variable is associated with the quantum system alone
(i.e. supplements the system’s quantum state vector) must display action-at-a-
distance of a Bohmian nature, if it is to be consistent with the predictions of
standard quantum mechanics. Specifically, what must be violated, in the case
of spatially separated spin-1/2 systems in the singlet state, is that The result
of a Stern-Gerlach measurement of a spin component on either system does not
depend on the setting of the magnet for the other system. (The more general
claim that in a deterministic hidden variable theory, the predicted outcome of
a measurement of an observable on one of a pair of entangled systems does not
depend on how a distant piece of equipment designed to measure any observable
on the other system is set up, will be referred to as the 1964 locality assumption.)
Bell’s 1964 result was ground-breaking in itself. But it is fair to say that it
was only part of the way to an answer to the specific question posed in the review
paper, because the Bohm theory generally involves in its deterministic algorithm
hidden variables associated with both the object system and the apparatus. Bell
was to look at generalisations of this kind of theory in 1971, and unwittingly
anticipated the later notion of local causality, as we shall see shortly.6
Bell started his 1964 paper by recalling that the 1935 Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) argument demonstrates, using the strict, or perfect correlations
involved in entangled systems, that if action-at-a-distance is to be avoided, the
standard quantum mechanical state could not be a complete description of the
systems in question.7 In particular Bell seems to have accepted that the perfect
anticorrelations for parallel spin components in the singlet state of spin-1/2 sys-
tems imply that a deterministic underpinning (‘causality’) is necessary if locality
in this sense is to prevail, and that this is the reason why a local deterministic
hidden variable theory is the focus of his 1964 paper.8 Bell showed that a local
Nor did Bell suspect in 1964 that a weaker (state-dependent) version of the Bell-Kochen-
Specker theorem for a single quantum system could be given in which a Bell-type inequality
is shown to be both a consequence of non-contextualism and violated by quantum mechanics.
This result is originally due to ?. They considered the case of a single valence electron, say
in an alkali atom, in the 2P 1
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state, in which the electron wavefunction involves entanglement
between spin and orbital angular momentum. A more manifestly self-consistent version of the
proof was given in ?. For details of other state-dependent versions of the Bell-Kochen-Specker
theorem see ?, section 2(iv), where it is argued that a result due to ? can be construed as
such.
6It is noteworthy that recently a third aspect of de Broglie–Bohm theory has been shown
to be universal for hidden variable theories: that the quantum state can not be entirely
‘epistemic’ in nature. See ? and ?.
7We disagree with a recent claim that the EPR argument presupposed more than stan-
dard quantum mechanics (with measurement induced collapse) and locality, the ‘more’ being
counterfactual definiteness; see ?.
8See ? for making the case that Bell viewed determinism as a strict consequence of the
EPR argument based on locality (no action-at-a-distance). Certainly after 1964, Bell was
explicit: ‘It is important to note that to the limited degree to which determinism played
a role in the EPR argument, it is not assumed but inferred.’ ?, p.143, original emphasis.
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deterministic hidden variable theory can easily be constructed to account for
such correlations, so he was fatefully drawn to investigate the weaker correla-
tions between non-parallel spin components on the distant systems: literally the
EPR–Bohm scenario with a twist.
In so far as Bell was to drop the deterministic requirement in his later papers,
the connection with the EPR argument became less tangible. And this had
to do with the fact that in its most general form, the derivation of Bell-type
inequalities based on some version of the locality condition transcends quantum
mechanics. It does not have to appeal to the existence of perfect EPR–Bohm
(anti-)correlations between distant systems. We shall return to this point below,
but in the meantime it is worth recalling the conclusion Bell draws from his 1964
theorem.
In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics
to determine the results of individual measurements, without chang-
ing the statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby
the setting of one measurement device can influence the reading of
another instrument, however remote. Moreover, the signal involved
must propagate instantaneously, so that such a theory could not be
Lorentz invariant. (?)
The conclusions in Bell’s 1976 and 1990 papers are much more nuanced. There,
as we shall see, there is no clear-cut claim of conflict with special relativity,
largely because of explicit recognition of what is now widely known as the no-
signalling theorem of quantum mechanics, which of course holds at the statistical
level and hence is insensitive to the existence of any nonlocal hidden substra-
tum.9 It is interesting though that a degree of caution, if not skepticism, about
the theorem emerges from Bell’s remarks (see below).
3 The legacy of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
We have seen that for Bell in 1964, the EPR argument was crucial in setting up
the conditions that lead to an inequality which is violated by quantum mechan-
ics. Einstein’s own conviction that locality (absence of action-at-a-distance)
and the completeness of quantum mechanics are incompatible actually predate
the 1935 collaboration with Podolosky and Rosen. In the 1927 Solvay con-
ference, Einstein used the single slit scenario to argue that detection of the
particle at one point on the hemispherical measuring instrument means that all
other points must instantaneously know not to detect, despite the wavefunction
However, disagreement has arisen in the literature as to the precise logic of Bell’s 1964 theorem,
with particular reference to the role of determinism. Some commentators see determinism as
one of the assumptions of the theorem (view 1), while others see it as a consequence of
the assumptions, which include the existence of perfect (anti)correlations. Clearly, if the
former position is correct, then the empirical violation of the Bell inequality implies either
indeterminism or nonlocality (in the 1964 sense of the term). A recent careful textual analysis
of Bell’s writings in the context of this debate is due to ?, who provides grounds for thinking
that in later life Bell’s own reading of his 1964 logic—in line with view 2—is questionable.
Note that nothing in our paper hangs on this debate.
9The no-signalling theorem in quantum mechanics only became prominent in the literature
in the late 1970s, though its first enunciation effectively goes back to David Bohm’s ? book
Quantum Theory. (Some historical details regarding the no-signalling theorem are found in
?, footnote 12; Bell’s 1976 discussion is regrettably overlooked.)
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of the particle having finite value at all such points prior to detection.10 In
fact, given the completeness assumption, measurement-induced collapse of the
wavefunction involves action-at-a-distance: one does not need entanglement and
EPR correlations to drive the nonlocality lesson home given such non-unitary
processes.
Unless one adopts something like Niels Bohr’s philosophy. Here, the wave-
function/state vector is thought to be the complete description of the quantum
system but somehow not in itself a physical object, and collapse (if one goes so
far as to describe in quantum mechanics what goes on the measurement process,
which Bohr did not) is thought not to represent a physical process.11 So the
EPR argument is best seen, like Newton’s bucket thought experiment, as polem-
ical in nature. Newton used the bucket to strike at the heart of Descartes’ theory
that for any body real motion is defined relative to the bodies immediately con-
tiguous to it, themselves being taken to be at rest.12 By cleverly exploiting
distant correlations, Einstein hoped to bypass the feature of quantum mechan-
ics that Bohr commonly used in defence of the claim that quantum mechanics
is complete notwithstanding its statistical character, namely, the ineradicable
local disturbance on the system caused by measurement. This aspect of the
EPR argument was appreciated by Bell, who in 1981 devastatingly exposed the
obscurity of Bohr’s 1935 response to the argument.13
Be that as it may, it is well known that Einstein was unhappy with the
way Podolsky had organised the argument, and in letters to Schro¨dinger had
vented his frustration that the basic lesson had been ‘smothered by the for-
malism’. Details concerning the form of the argument that Einstein preferred
will not be rehearsed here14, yet it is worth mentioning the thought experiment
known as ‘Einstein’s boxes’.15 Writing to Schro¨dinger in 1935, Einstein imag-
ined a box with a single classical particle inside. The box is then divided into
two and each half-box spatially separated. The particle by chance ends up in
one of them, and Einstein used this scenario to explain what he meant by an
‘incomplete’ description of the particle and what he meant by the ‘separation
principle’ (locality), all with a view to better articulating the quantum EPR sce-
nario involving entanglement. But it was de Broglie in 196416 who considered
the analogue of the boxes scenario with a quantum particle, its wavefunction
now in a superposition of components in each half-box prior to their opening.
Given the strict anticorrelation between the outcomes of opening the boxes, this
gedanken experiment has all the features required for an EPR-type argument
inferring nonlocality (action-at-a-distance) from completeness of the wave func-
tional description, but without entanglement. It is a variant of Einstein’s 1927
single slit diffraction argument, and both arguments will feature below.
10? and ?.
11See, for example, ?, p.53.
12See ?, pp.623–628.
13See ?, Appendix 1.
14A useful account of Einstein’s criticisms of the EPR paper is found in ?, chapters 3 and
5; see also ? and ? for further discussion of Einstein’s overarching view on locality.
15This terminology is due to ?, p.37; a fuller discussion of the history of the thought exper-
iment is found in ?.
16See ? and ?.
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4 Local causality
Suppose now we step back from quantum mechanics and consider some hypo-
thetical probabilistic theory involving microscopic systems. Suppose the prob-
abilities referring to measurement outcomes in the theory are understood to be
irreducible, the dynamics of the relevant processes being intrinsically stochas-
tic.17 Imagine further that a pure ensemble of spatially separated bipartite
systems along with measurement devices can be prepared in which by hypoth-
esis no interactions are taking place between them. Would we not expect the
statistical outcomes of the measurement events on the separated systems to be
independent, i.e. for there to be no correlations?
Something akin to this no-correlations condition was introduced into Bell’s
writings explicitly in 1976. We shall examine its formal representation, as well
as its (dubious) connection with Hans Reichenbach’s famous Common Cause
Principle (?), in Section ?? below. In the meantime a little history may be
useful.
In his second paper on nonlocality, published in ?, Bell considered a class of
hidden variable theories explicitly modelled on the 1952 Bohm theory, in which
the predictions of measurement outcomes depend deterministically on hidden
(hence uncontrollable) variables associated both with the object system and the
apparatus. Averaging over the latter, Bell noted that the theory now took the
form of an indeterministic hidden variable theory for measurements occurring
on the object system. In his derivation of the ? Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt
(CHSH) inequality for this stochastic theory involving pairs of distant systems,
Bell took as his locality condition that these average predictions on one system
did not depend on the controllable setting of the distant measurement device.
But another assumption was hidden in the derivation: that such averages for
pairs of simultaneous measurements on the distant systems factorize.18 It is true
that this is a consequence of the the locality of the background deterministic
theory,19 but it was a foretaste of what was to come in Bell’s thinking about his
theorem.20
Note that Bell himself was aware that if one added to his 1971 derivation
the existence of strict EPR–Bohm anticorrelations in the spherically symmetric
spin singlet state, then his original 1964 version of the inequality is obtained
from that of CHSH. More to the point, Bell was conscious that allowing for the
strict anticorrelations meant that the apparatus hidden variables can play no
role in the predictions, so that even the apparent indeterminism of the averaged
theory is spurious. But one sees in this 1971 paper that Bell was starting to
follow CHSH in considering generalised local theories as the proper background
to the Bell theorem, in which no constraints on correlations exist other than
17Technically what this means is that the theory allows no dispersion-free pure ensembles
and yet is assumed to be ‘statistically complete’. Recall that pure states are those which
cannot be expressed as a convex combination of other distinct states. Statistical completeness
entails that arbitrary ensembles of the joint system-apparatus which are pure—i.e. all joint
systems therein share the same pure state—are homogeneous in the sense of von Neumann.
A detailed analysis of this notion of statistical completeness, which is distinct from the EPR
notion of completeness, is found in ?.
18See ?, p.1385, and ?, §II).
19Cf. ?, §II.
20Bell noted that the 1971 locality condition ‘Clearly...is appropriate also for indeterminism
with a certain local character.’ (?, fn.10) original emphasis.
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those imposed by locality.
The first clear articulation of this program for the case of genuinely stochas-
tic (indeterministic) theories was due to John Clauser and Michael Horne in
?. In defining locality in this context these authors explicitly distinguished
between two predictive constraints: independence of the distant apparatus set-
ting (sometimes called parameter independence) and the absence of correlations
conditional on specification of the pure state of the pair of systems (conditional
outcome independence, or Jarrett completeness21). The subtle business of how
to motivate these constraints, and the connection, if any, with the principle of
no action-at-a-distance, will be discussed below in Section ??. In ?, Suppes and
Zanotti proved in a general way what Bell noted in his 1971 paper, namely that
if one imposes these two ‘locality’ constraints for a stochastic theory of pairs of
systems, and moreover postulates the existence of perfect (anti)correlations of
the kind associated with the spin singlet state, then the theory is reduced to a
deterministic one (?).22
Suppose only conditional outcome independence is assumed, and not pa-
rameter independence. Then the work of Suppes and Zanotti (1976) implies in
the case of the spin singlet state that the marginal probabilities for values of
the spin components are zero or one in every case where the spin-devices are
parallel-oriented. So there will be elements of reality at one wing of the exper-
iment which can be brought in and out of existence by varying the orientation
of the device at the other wing. In this case, the joint locality condition reverts
to the prohibition of action-at-a-distance. However, it is important to bear in
mind at this point that an implicit, but highly non-trivial assumption is being
made in the Suppes and Zanotti argument, as well as in Bell’s own application
of perfect (anti)correlations in order to restore determinism: that in each mea-
surement process, one and only one outcome is realised. We return to this issue
in Section ?? below.
In 1976 there also appears for the first time in Bell’s writings both the explicit
notion and terminology of ‘local causality’ associated with stochastic theories
of physical reality.23 As he was famously to articulate in his later ? ‘Against
measurement’, Bell was deeply suspicious of the cavalier way such common but
non-fundamental notions as ‘observable’, ‘system’ and ‘measurement’ are often
used in quantum mechanics. In his 1976 paper on ‘local beables’, Bell defines
the factorizability condition not in terms of measurement outcomes on bipartite
systems, but in terms of the beables in spacelike separated regions of space-
time, conditional on the complete specification of all the beables belonging to
the overlap of the backward light cones of these regions. There is no splitting
of the local causality condition into anything like parameter independence and
conditional outcome independence, because measurement processes do not ex-
plicitly figure in the analysis. Two inequalities are derived in Bell’s 1976 paper.
The first involves nothing but beables and their correlations; the second—a
variation of the CHSH inequality—emerges from the first when ‘in comparison
21The widespread appreciation that two distinct assumptions are at play in the early versions
of the stochastic version of the Bell theorem is due in good part to the work of ?.
22The same situation holds for the triplet state for spin- 1
2
systems despite its lack of spher-
ical symmetry. This is because for any spin component on one subsystem, there is a spin
component on the other with which it is perfectly correlated (though this is not in general the
component anti-parallel to the first as in the case of the singlet state).
23Confusingly, at times Bell would use the term ‘local causality’ when he explicitly meant
no action-at-a-distance in the context of the EPR argument, as in ?, p.143.
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with quantum mechanics’, some beables are interpreted as controllable variables
specifying the experimental set-up, and some are ‘either hidden or irrelevant’
and averaged over as in the 1971 paper.
5 The 1976 paper
There are several remarkable features of Bell’s 1976 paper.
1. More than ever before in Bell’s writings, his theorem stands alone from
quantum mechanics. In contradistinction to his 1971 paper, Bell starts
by considering a loosely defined but genuinely indeterministic theory of
nature, and the derivation of the (first) inequality conspicuously holds
without any reference to quantum features, and depends only on the re-
quirement of local causality.
We would like to form some [notion] of local causality in theories
which are not deterministic, in which the correlations prescribed
by the theory, for the beables, are weaker. (?, p.53)
2. For the first time, Bell states that ‘ordinary quantum mechanics, even the
relativistic quantum field theory, is not locally causal’. The claim does not
depend on his theorem. It does not depend on the violation of a Bell-type
inequality: it does not even depend on entanglement in the usual sense.
The argument Bell gives concerns a single radioactive decay process and
several spatially separated detectors; it is analogous to Einstein’s 1927
argument involving single slit diffraction, and to the Einstein-de Broglie
boxes thought experiment, both referred to earlier. (This aspect of Bell’s
reasoning has been little appreciated in the literature, and it was partially
lost sight of in his final 1990 paper.)
3. Bell importantly qualifies the significance of local causality in the light of
the no-signalling theorem, which makes it first appearance in his work,
and which itself is qualified in terms of its ‘human’ origins. This hesitancy
is repeated in 1990, as we see in the following section.
4. When Bell does apply his theorem to quantum mechanics, it is in the
context of a putative locally causal, indeterministic hidden variable ‘com-
pletion’ of the theory. But now there is no mention of the EPR-Bohm
(anti)correlations: the legacy of EPR, so vital in the 1964 paper, has been
put aside.
Let us ruminate a little on this last point. To ignore perfect EPR–Bohm
(anti)correlations is not to deny their existence. But if they exist, then, as we
have seen, in the usual setting, stochasticity collapses into determinism and
the meaning of local causality reverts simply to the prohibition of action-at-a-
distance. It is understandable then that Maudlin in 2010 construes the legacy of
Bell’s work to have been the demonstration that standard quantum mechanics
is nonlocal in the original 1964 sense, and that the proof does not presuppose
the existence of hidden variables, or the related condition of ‘counterfactual
definiteness’, as long as EPR–Bohm correlations are assumed and the possibility
of Everettian branching is ruled out (see below). Rather, the existence of a
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deterministic substratum (and hence counterfactual definiteness) is inferred in
the proof, and locality further constrains the phenomenological correlations so
as to satisfy a Bell inequality, which quantum mechanics violates in certain
scenarios involving entangled states.24
This view of things does not seem to accord with Bell’s thinking from 1976
on. As we have seen, the demonstration that quantum mechanics violates the
new condition of local causality is fairly elementary and needs no appeal to the
Bell theorem or even entanglement. The Bell theorem itself refers to locally
causal stochastic theories generally, and when it is applied to the specific case
of quantum mechanics, it is to some stochastic ‘completion’ of the theory which
can have no justification in terms of the EPR argument. In 1981, in his famous
paper ‘Bertlemann’s socks and the nature of reality’, Bell made clear what his
position on the EPR–Bohm anticorrelations came to be:
Some residual imperfection of the set-up would spoil the perfect
anticorrelations ... So in the more sophisticated argument we will
avoid any hypothesis of perfection.
It was only in the context of perfect correlation (or anticorrelation)
that determinism could be inferred for the relation of observation re-
sults to preexisting particle properties (for any indeterminism would
have spoiled the correlation). Despite my insistence that determin-
ism was inferred rather than assumed, you might still suspect some-
how that it is a preoccupation with determinism that creates the
problem. Note well then that the following argument [derivation of
the CHSH inequality based on local causality] makes no mention
whatever of determinism. (?) emphasis in original.
Granted, perfect (anti)correlations are operationally inaccessible; indeed this
was the motivation for the CHSH inequality. This inequality is testable in
a way Bell’s original 1964 inequality is not. But we should not lose sight of
the fact that every experimental corroboration of the general correlation pre-
dictions in quantum mechanics for entangled states provides indirect evidence
for the perfect (anti)correlations in the EPR-Bohm scenario, which in turn are
connected with the fact that the spin singlet state has zero total spin angular
momentum. It is noteworthy that the perfect (anti)correlations reappear in
Bell’s 1990 paper, as seen below.
We are thus led to the view that from 1976 on in Bell’s writings, when he
refers to a putative locally causal, stochastic, hidden variable ‘completion’ of
quantum mechanics, this theory should be understood in the following sense.
Either it is a truncated theory restricted to certain non-parallel settings, or one
incorporating an approximation to quantum mechanics whose correlation pre-
dictions concur with those of quantum mechanics for parallel settings to within
experimental error (and so the theory may depend on the chosen experimental
set-up). Otherwise, the theory is not stochastic at all, as we saw in Section ??.
24?. Maudlin is one of those defending view 2 mentioned in footnote ?? above, namely that
determinism is not an assumption in Bell’s original 1964 theorem. Again, we emphasise that
we are interested here in a certain reading of the theorem, not whether Bell himself adopted
it in 1964.
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6 Local causality, no-signalling and relativity
The factorizability condition related to local causality first introduced by Bell
in 1976 was itself to undergo a minor change in his later writings. He came
to realise that it is unnecessary to conditionalize on complete specification of
beables in an infinite space-time region, and a ‘simpler’ version of the condition
involving beables in finite regions appeared informally in a footnote in ?.25
A more systematic rendering of this ‘simpler’ version appeared in Bell’s final
1990 paper ‘La nouvelle cuisine’, which first appeared in the second edition of
Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics.
The details need not detain us yet. But note that in the 1990 paper, when
Bell discusses the reason for the violation of local causality by ‘ordinary quantum
mechanics’, as in the 1976 paper he makes no to appeal to the violation of a
Bell-type inequality and hence to the Bell theorem, but now he does refer to
entanglement and in particular an optical version of the EPR–Bohm scenario
with perfect correlations. (Compare with point 2 in the previous section.)
Does the fact that quantum mechanics violates local causality mean it is
inconsistent with special relativity? This is a question over which Bell wavered
for a number of years, and in attempting to understand his position it is impor-
tant to distinguish between ‘ordinary’ quantum mechanics and the hypothetical
‘deeper’ level of hidden variables.
Recall that in 1964, Bell categorically concluded that any deterministic hid-
den variable theory consistent with the standard quantum mechanical predic-
tions could not be Lorentz covariant, though in 1976 he was more nuanced about
the violation of local causality. In 1984 he wrote:
For me then this is the real problem with quantum theory: the
apparently essential conflict between any sharp formulation and fun-
damental relativity. That is to say, we have an apparent incompat-
ibility, at the deepest level, between the two fundamental pillars of
contemporary theory ...(?)
Note the qualifying adjectives ‘apparent’ and ‘fundamental’. In his influential
essay of 1976, ‘How to teach special relativity’ (?), Bell advocated a dynamical
Lorentzian pedagogy in relation to the explanation of kinematic effects such
as length contraction and time dilation. He stressed that one is not thereby
committed to a Lorentzian ‘philosophy’ involving a privileged inertial frame, as
opposed to Einstein’s austere philosophy which rejects the existence of such a
frame. However, Bell also emphasised that ‘The facts of physics do not oblige
us to accept one philosophy rather than the other.’ When he was asked in a
recorded interview, first published in 1986, how he might respond to the possible
existence of ‘faster-than-light signalling’ in the Aspect experiment, Bell returned
to this theme.
... I would say that the cheapest resolution is something like going
back to relativity as it was before Einstein, when people like Lorentz
25?, fn. 7. In his Preface to the first edition of Speakable, Bell expressed regret that this
slimmer version, which he had used in talks, had not been introduced earlier in his papers;
see ?, p.xii. There is also a reminder in the Preface that ‘If local causality in some theory is
to be examined, then one must decide which of the many mathematical entities that appear
are supposed to be real, and really here rather than there.’ibid.
11
and Poincare´ thought that there was an aether—a preferred frame
of reference—but that our measuring instruments were distorted by
motion in such a way that we could not detect motion through the
aether. Now, in that way you can imagine that there is a preferred
frame of reference, and in this preferred frame of reference things do
go faster than light. ... Behind the apparent Lorentz invariance of
the phenomena, there is a deeper level which is not Lorentz invariant
... [This] pre-Einstein position of Lorentz and Poincare´, Larmor and
Fitzgerald (sic), was perfectly coherent, and is not inconsistent with
relativity theory. (?) our emphasis.
This is a very different tone to the one at the end of Bell’s 1964 paper, in which
the failure of Lorentz covariance in any deterministic hidden variable theory is
announced without any redemptive features. In 1986 he is adopting the perfectly
defensible view that special relativity strictly only holds for physics that has
phenomenological consequences, i.e. that is not ‘hidden’. Note that Bell does
not clarify here what goes faster than light in the ‘deeper level’ in quantum
mechanics. Given the context of the discussion, it seems that something like
the action-at-a-distance in the Bohm theory is what Bell had in mind. But the
question is more pressing if the issue is violation of local causality, when it is
just ‘ordinary’ quantum mechanics or quantum field theory that is in question.
In his ‘La nouvelle cuisine’ paper, Bell harks back to his 1976 discussion of
the nonlocality theorem and provides a particularly careful demarcation between
the condition of local causality and that of ‘no-superluminal-signalling’. In
connection with the latter, Bell investigates the case of external interventions in
local relativistic quantum field theory, and concludes, unsurprisingly, that the
statistical predictions are insensitive to the introduction of external fields outside
the backward light cone of the relevant ‘observables’. But he is worried by what
is truly meant by the notion of ‘external’ intervention. At the end of the paper
he returns to the no-signalling theorem in standard quantum mechanics, and he
similarly expresses concerns about its fundamentality, just as he had in 1976.
He is worried, as always, about the vagueness or lack of conceptual sharpness in
the theorem, which results from the anthropocentric element lurking behind the
notions therein of measurement and preparation, and indeed this issue appears
to be the lingering concern in the conclusion to the 1990 paper. There is no
categorical statement in the paper that violation of local causality is inconsistent
with special relativity.
7 Motivating local causality
In ‘La nouvelle cuisine’, Bell emphasised that even if a theory is well-behaved
relativistically in the strict sense of allowing for no superluminal signalling, this
is not enough to satisfy his causal intuitions. What then is the motivation
for local causality? We need, at last, to look in detail at the definition and
significance of the factorizability condition as given in this 1990 paper. Here is
what Bell says:
A theory will be said to be locally causal if the probabilities attached
to values of local beables in a space-time region 1 are unaltered
by specification of values of local beables in a space-like separated
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Figure 1: Spacetime regions involved in Bell’s 1990 statement of local causality
region 2, when what happens in the backward light cone of 1 is
already sufficiently specified, for example by a full specification of
local beables in a space-time region 3... (?, pp.239–40)
What is particularly relevant for our purposes is the intuition behind local
causality that Bell provided in 1990:
The direct causes (and effects) are near by, and even the indi-
rect causes (and effects) are no further away than permitted by the
velocity of light.(?, p.239)
It is important for our subsequent discussion to highlight some key assumptions
involved here. The first is the very existence of causal processes, which are
normally taken to be time-asymmetric: causal influences propagate into the
future, not the past. (Note the reference to backward light cones in the first
quote.) An awkwardness arises because there is nothing in the postulates of
special relativity that picks out an arrow of time. (Whether the situation is any
different in quantum mechanics is clearly an interpretation-dependent issue.)
At any rate, operationally the notion of cause had to be cashed out by Bell
in probabilistic terms; he conceded that the factorizability condition associated
with local causality makes no explicit reference to causes. ‘Note ... that our
definition of locally causal theories, although motivated by talk of “cause” and
“effect”, does not in the end explicitly involve these rather vague notions.’ (?,
p.240)
Note that the introduction of probabilities introduces further awkwardness
into the picture. Special relativity is based on the claim that the fundamen-
tal equations governing the non-gravitational interactions are Lorentz covari-
ant. Such equations are normally assumed to be deterministic. How irreducible
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probabilities are supposed to inhabit a relativistic world is a difficult technical
matter, which Bell, perhaps wisely, overlooks. And it is worth recognising at
this point that unless probabilities in this context are understood themselves to
be objective elements of reality, things go awry. There is an old view, by no
means consensual of course, that probability in physics in general does not rep-
resent an objective element of reality.26 If this were true, the representation of
purportedly objective causal facts by constraints on probabilities becomes prob-
lematic and the status of factorizability somewhat questionable. In particular,
the connection with the clear-cut condition of no action-at-a-distance involved
in Bell’s 1964 paper becomes tenuous. This concern might seem misplaced in
the context of an indeterministic theory, but what about a deterministic theory
with intrinsic unpredictability, as in the Everett picture (see next section)?
The second (widely-held) assumption Bell is making is that the null cone
structure of Minkowski space-time represents the boundaries of causal con-
nectibility. The kinematics of special relativity imply that the speed of light
is invariant across inertial frames, and the usual dynamical postulates (over and
above Lorentz covariance) concerning the connection between energy, momen-
tum and velocity imply that massive bodies cannot be accelerated up to the
speed of light, let alone beyond. But whether tachyonic signals are inconsis-
tent with special relativity is a more delicate matter, and Bell was fully aware
of this. As he put it: ‘What we have to do is add to the laws of relativity
some responsible causal structure. ... we require [causal chains] ... to go slower
than light in any [inertial] frame of reference.’ (?) Bell was effectively—and
plausibly—assuming that tachyonic signals do not exist. But the justification
Bell gave in section 4 of the Nouvelle Cuisine paper is amusing. It involves con-
sidering the ‘perfect tachyon crime’ involving a gunman firing a tachyon gun.
The movement of the murderer can be set up in such a way that according to the
description of the deed relative to the rest frame of the victim, and the courts
of justice, the trigger is pulled after the death of the victim! The ensuing ‘rela-
tivity of morality’ should be ruled out by the laws of nature, suggests Bell. This
injunction is obviously high-handed—why should Nature care about our moral
qualms? Playfully or otherwise, Bell is insisting on first principles that superlu-
minal signalling be banished from Minkoswksi space-time, and as we mentioned
in the last section, he goes on to show in the 1990 paper that quantum theory
does not violate this injunction. But, to repeat, there is still a distance between
no-signalling and local causality, particularly in the case where the candidate
indeterministic theory is acting as a completion of ordinary quantum mechanics,
as will be seen in the next section.
Bell emphasised that the factorizability condition is not to be seen ‘as the
formulation of local causality, but as a consequence thereof.’ He was very con-
cerned that in providing a clean mathematical consequence of local causality,
one is ‘likely to throw out the baby with the bathwater’. Indeed, careful analysis
of the task that presents itself in the attempt to translate Bell’s causal intuitions
into well-defined probabilistic form shows how subtle the matter is. This has be-
come especially clear through the recent work of ?, and ?. However, we will stick
to the specific form of factorizability Bell gave in the Nouvelle Cuisine paper as
applicable to EPR–Bell experiments, where the candidate indeterministic theory
26A version of this view, in which probability is ‘a numerical expression of human ignorance’,
has recently been defended by ? for example. See also ?? and Healey ?, and this volume, for
various developments of related ideas.
14
is now understood to be a completion of ordinary quantum mechanics (subject
to the qualification mentioned at the end of Section ??). Here, Bell extended
the space-time region 3 in the figure above to cross the backward light cones of
both regions 1 and 2 where they no longer overlap. In this extended region 3,
Bell denoted by the symbol c the values of any number of variables describing
the experimental set up as given in ordinary quantum mechanics, except the
final settings (of magnets, polarisers, or the like) that are determined in regions
1 and 2. Presumably included in c is the entangled quantum state. Also de-
fined in the extended region 3, and denoted by λ, is ‘any number of additional
complementary variables needed to complete quantum mechanics in the way
envisaged by EPR.’ Note that they too are not assumed to be spatially separa-
ble. Together c and λ give a ‘complete specification of at least those parts of 3
blocking the two backward light cones’. Then Bell’s specific 1990 factorizability
condition is
P (A,B|a, b, c, λ) = P (A|a, c, λ)P (B|b, c, λ) (1)
where P (A,B|a, b, c, λ) is the joint probability in the candidate theory for out-
come A associated with a binary random variable in an experiment in region 1
with setting (free variable) a, and outcome B in an experiment in region 2 with
setting b, conditional on c and λ. The factors in the product on the RHS are
the respective conditional marginal probabilities.
8 Unpacking factorizability
As we have mentioned, ever since the 1974 work of Clauser and Horne, rein-
forced by that of Jarrett and also of Shimony (e.g., ?), it has been regarded
as conceptually helpful to separate any such factorizability condition into two
components:
P (A|a, b, c, λ) = P (A|a, c, λ), (2a)
P (B|a, b, c, λ) = P (B|b, c, λ), (2b)
and
P (A|B, a, b, c, λ) = P (A|a, b, c, λ), (3a)
P (B|A, a, b, c, λ) = P (B|a, b, c, λ). (3b)
Equations (2) indicate that the marginal probabilities do not depend on the
settings of the distant piece of apparatus. This ‘parameter independence’ as-
sumption (‘functional sufficiency’ in the language of Seevinck and Uffink) is the
probabilistic analogue of the locality assumption in Bell’s 1964 paper. Equa-
tions (3) known, as we have said, as ‘conditional outcome independence’ or
‘Jarrett completeness’ (‘statistical sufficiency’ for Seevinck and Uffink) rule out
correlations conditional on the combination of c and λ. A great deal of dis-
cussion has of course taken place since the 1970s about these conditions, and
indeed their non-uniqueness, but let us note the claim by Seevinck and Uffink
that each condition has the same motivation as the factorizability condition (1)
itself: ‘Both [conditions] are a consequence of local causality, and the appeal
to notions of locality and causality used in implementing the functional and
statistical sufficiency are just the same ...” (?, p.12)
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But now that the candidate indeterministic theory is one into which quan-
tum mechanics is embeddable, the specification of λ involves hidden variables.
Wouldn’t doubt be thrown in this case on the plausibility of parameter indepen-
dence (2), in particular, given Bell’s own doubts whether what is ‘hidden’ can
ever threaten relativity? Maybe, but as we have seen in the previous section,
the issue is not just consistency with relativity, whether in the sense of requir-
ing Lorentz covariance or in the sense of precluding tachyonic signalling. As
regards outcome independence (3), ordinary quantum mechanics (in which λ is
the empty set) violates it, but again no threat to a ‘responsible causal structure’
containing a ban on tachyonic signals automatically arises as a result.
Let us consider this condition (3) in more detail. It is often regarded as
a special case (within a relativistic space-time) of Reichenbach’s ? Common
Cause Principle,27 which is based on the general notion that if events X and
Y are correlated, then either X(Y ) is the cause of Y (X) or there is a common
cause in the past (?, §19). Conditional on the common cause, the correlations
between X and Y must disappear (the so-called ‘screening-off’ condition). But
although this principle is a useful heuristic in daily life, Reichenbach’s own writ-
ings on the matter should make us pause before applying it to microphenomena
(whether classical or quantum) involving a small number of systems. What is
amply clear in Reichenbach’s 1956 discussion of the principle is that it holds
for ‘macrostatistics’, that is to say systems sufficiently complex to display en-
tropic behaviour. For Reichenbach, the notions of cause and effect only make
sense in macro-phenomena displaying quasi-irreversible behaviour: ‘The dis-
tinction between cause and effect is revealed to be a matter of entropy and to
coincide with the difference between past and future.’ (?, p. 155) There is of
course irreversibility associated with the measurement processes themselves in
an EPR–Bell experiment, but it may not be enough to resolve the conundrum in
Reichenbach’s own terms, although he was not entirely consistent on the whole
matter.28
To the extent that Reichenbach’s common cause principle is cogently ap-
plicable to Bell-type experiments, there is arguably a missing element in Re-
ichenbach’s analysis, which was largely motivated by common-place correlations
involving familiar day-to-day phenomena. In the case of a strictly indetermin-
istic microphysics of the kind Bell considered from 1976 on, the motivation for
conditional outcome independence is arguably stronger than anything Reichen-
bach had in mind. Bell was envisaging outcomes of measurements in regions
1 and 2 which are intrinsically random, associated with irreducible probabili-
ties. What kind of explanation can there be for correlations between separate,
strictly random processes? Note that the puzzle does not require reference to
space-like separations defined relative to the light cone structure; it would pre-
sumably arise even in Galilean space-time for simultaneous events as long as
the dynamics in the candidate indeterministic theory did not allow for instan-
27See for example ?, ???, ?.
28At the end of his 1956 book, Reichenbach asserted that quantum mechanics—even at
the statistical level—no more introduces a fundamental arrow of time than does classical
mechanics (p. 211). As for probabilities themselves, Reichenbach defined them in terms of
relative frequencies, so they are time symmetric in his book. It is then hard to see how he could
apply his common cause principle to quantum phenomena involving small numbers of systems,
and yet he seems to have done so! Reichenbach states in the book that the statistics of pairs
of identical bosonic particles engender ‘causal anomalies’—i.e. violate his principle—unless
the assignment of physical identity to the particles is given up (p. 234).
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taneous interactions between separated systems. The profound oddity of such
correlations—let us call it the randomness problem—goes hand in hand with
the natural view that probabilities in strictly indeterministic theories are, pace
Tipler, objective. (We shall return to the randomness problem in Section ??.)
Bell himself did not put things quite this way. A noteworthy element of
his surprisingly tentative, but always honest, thinking in the Nouvelle Cuisine
paper comes in the Conclusion:
Do we then have to fall back on ‘no signalling faster than light’ as
the expression of the fundamental causal structure of contemporary
theoretical physics? That is hard for me to accept. For one thing
we have lost the idea that correlations can be explained, or at least
this idea awaits reformulation. [emphasis added]
Precisely what Bell meant here is perhaps not entirely clear. We take him to
be saying that if we stop short of demanding of a causally well-behaved theory
that it satisfy the factorisability condition (local causality) and impose only
the no-signalling constraint (a recent suggestion of such an approach is ? for
example), then we are no longer in a position to explain, or to expect to explain,
the quantum correlations. Such a view would compromise the motivation for
the search for a locally causal stochastic completion of quantum mechanics. It
would diminish the importance of the conclusion of post-1976 version of the
Bell theorem, which is that locally causal, stochastic explanations of quantum
correlations are, in the end, unavailable.
How bad is that? Such a blunt question is partly motivated by Bell’s own
doubts: earlier in the 1990 paper he recommended that the factorizability con-
dition ‘be viewed with the utmost suspicion’. Could it be that his misgivings
had to do with the fact that all the motivation for the condition provided in
his papers is couched in abstract terms, with no guidance from concrete mod-
els? Bell himself stressed the importance of the role of models in checking our
physical intuitions; in particular he laid stress on study of the details of the
de Broglie–Bohm theory in the context of theorising about the nature of de-
terministic hidden variable theories. The same kind of lesson was stressed by
?. In this spirit, we think that the Everett picture of quantum mechanics can
play an illuminating role in understanding the significance of factorizability. It
is a model in which, remarkably, there is intrinsic unpredictability, but no strict
indeterminism, thus opening the door to a nuanced notion of randomness, and
more imortantly, probability. The branching structure of the universe gives rise
to a subtle reinterpretation of the notion of correlations between entangled sys-
tems. Most significantly, the Everett version of quantum mechanics provides a
Lorentz covariant picture of the world in which factorizability fails but there is
no action-at-a-distance.
9 Locality in the Everett picture
Amongst those who have taken Everett’s approach to quantum theory at all seri-
ously as an option, it is a commonplace that—given an Everettian interpretation—
quantum theory is (dynamically) local—there is no action-at-a-distance. Indeed
this is often taken as one of the main selling-points of an Everettian approach (cf.
?, for example). Everett himself noted that his approach obviated the ‘fictitious
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paradox’ of EPR (?, §5.3), though he didn’t go into details, beyond noting the
crucial role of the collapse of the wavefunction in the EPR argument—collapse
which is of course absent in purely unitary Everettian quantum mechanics. ?
filled-in the details of how the absence of collapse in Everett circumvents the
EPR dilemma. Other discussions of locality in Everett, covering also the exten-
sion to Bell’s argument as well as EPR’s, include amongst others ?, ?, ?, and
?.29
A number of interrelated factors are involved in Everett’s theory being lo-
cal.30 First, the point already noted, that by remaining within purely unitary
quantum mechanics—thus eschewing collapse—one moves out of range of the
EPR argument, even if one believes (contra Bohr et al.) that the wavefunc-
tion should be understood realistically. Second, the point that the unitary dy-
namics itself derives from local Hamiltonians (in the relativistic context, more-
over, Lorentz-covariant Hamiltonians) which include only point-like interactions.
Third, the fact that the fundamental states of the theory are non-separable, due
to entanglement: it is not the case that the properties of a joint system are
determined by the properties of the individual parts taken in isolation. And
fourth, the crucial fact that following a measurement, it is generally not the
case that there is one unique outcome of the measurement. It is this last, of
course, which lies behind the ‘many worlds’ conception of the theory: following
a measurement interaction between a measuring apparatus and a system not in
an eigenstate of the quantity being measured, the measuring apparatus will be
left in a superposition of its indicator states. Unitary processes of decoherence
lead to effective non-interaction between the different terms in this superpo-
sition, and lead to effective classicality for their future evolution over time.
As further items interact with the apparatus—whether environmental (noise)
degrees of freedom, or perhaps observers in the lab—they too become drawn
linearly into the superposition, becoming part of the overall entangled state. An
effective branching structure of macroscopically determinate goings-on emerges
(at least at a suitably coarse-grained level) and we can reasonably call these
emergent branches of effectively isolated, quasi-classical, macroscopically deter-
minate goings-on, worlds. Within particular branches in the structure will be
found measuring apparatuses each giving definite readings for the outcome of
experiments performed, and correlated with these can be found observers, each
of whom will see their measuring device indicating a single particular result of
measurement. But zooming-out (in a God’s-eye view) from a particular branch
will be seen all the other branches, each with a different result of measurement
being recorded and observed, all coexisting equally; and all underpinned by (su-
pervenient on) the deterministically, unitarily, evolving universal wavefunction.
Now why is this fourth factor—the non-uniqueness in the complete state of
29See also ?, Chapter 8. Another important stream in the locality-in-Everett literature
begins with ? and their emphasis of locality in Everettian Heisenberg picture quantum me-
chanics. (See also (????).) However, Deutsch and Hayden’s claims are best understood not
as addressing the question of locality in the sense of no action-at-a-distance, but rather the
distinct question of the separability of the states of one’s fundamental theory. See (????).
Another example of an essentially Everettian treatment is the recent ?.
30Whilst we speak of Everett’s theory or of Everettian quantum mechanics or of the Ev-
errett interpretation, it is of course true that Everett’s original ideas have been developed in
rather different directions by different authors. Nothing much in our present discussion of
locality hangs on this, in our view, but for the record, we take the current canonical form of
Everretianism to be that articulated in (??????).
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the world of the measurement outcomes for a given measurement—so signifi-
cant when it comes to considering locality? Some commentators point out—
plausibly—that it is simply an implicit premise in Bell’s discussions that speci-
fied measurements, when performed, do have unique outcomes: that the beables
that obtain in a given region of spacetime where a measurement has taken place
do fix a unique value for the outcome of that measurement (do fix, that is, a
unique value for the quantity measured). When this implicit premise is given
up, Bell’s reasoning just doesn’t apply, they note (?, p.310, ?, ?)31. In that case,
we can infer nothing as to the presence or absence of locality in a theory when
it violates a Bell-inequality, or equivalently, when it violates factorisability.
This response is correct, so far as it goes, but i) it is perhaps less obvious
how ‘unique outcomes’ functions as an assumption in Bell’s reasoning once he
moved to consider stochastic theories and local causality as formulated from
1976 on, rather than the deterministic theories of 1964, and ii) one can hope to
say a little more to illuminate the situation than just that this implicit premise
fails. Indeed, regarding (ii) it is in our view rather helpful to go into some of
the details of how in fact the Everett interpretation deals with the generation
of correlations in EPR and Bell settings in a local manner, when this proves so
difficult to do, or impossible to do, for other approaches. For convenience we
will recapitulate here the analysis we gave in ? before going on to make some
further points. We will return to address (i) briefly in Section ??.
9.1 EPR and Bell correlations in the Everettian setting
It is a straightforward matter to apply Everettian measurement theory in
the context of EPR-Bell scenarios. (Very similar analyses can also be
found elsewhere, for example in (??)). We will discuss once again, by way
of concrete example, the Bohm version of the EPR experiment, involving
spin. We begin with two spin-1/2 systems (labelled 1 and 2) prepared in
a singlet state. The relevant degrees of freedom (the ‘pointer variables’)
of measuring apparatuses mA,mB in widely separated regions A and B of
space we can model as two-state systems with basis states {| ↑〉A, | ↓〉A},
{| ↑〉B , | ↓〉B} respectively. Measurement by apparatus A of the component
of spin at an angle θ from the z-axis on system 1 would have the effect
U(θ)
{ |↑θ〉1|↑θ〉A 7→ |↑θ〉1|↑θ〉A
|↓θ〉1|↑θ〉A 7→ |↓θ〉1|↓θ〉A , (4)
where | ↑θ〉, | ↓θ〉 are eigenstates of spin in the rotated direction; similarly for
measurement of system 2 by apparatus B.32
9.1.1 Case 1: Perfect correlations (EPR)
Now consider the case in which our measuring apparatuses are perfectly aligned
with one another, as in the EPR example. The initial state of the whole system
is
31In ?, that measurements yield unique outcomes is stipulated in Axiom 1, p. 4; see also
the first paragraph of section 7 therein.
32Of course, for a measurement truly to have taken place, the indicator states of the appara-
tus would also need to have been irreversibly decohered by their environment, and themselves
to be robust against decoherence. We can put these complications to one side for the purposes
of our schematic model.
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|↑〉A 1√2
(|↑〉1|↓〉2 − |↓〉1|↑〉2)|↑〉B . (5)
Note that the states of the measuring apparatuses factorise: at this stage, they
are independent of the states of the spin-1/2 particles. For the measurements
to be made, systems 1 and 2 are taken to regions A and B respectively and
measurement interactions of the form (??) occur (the time order of these inter-
actions is immaterial); we finish with the state
1√
2
(|↑〉A|↑〉1|↓〉2|↓〉B − |↓〉A|↓〉1|↑〉2|↑〉B). (6)
Now definite states of the measuring device mA are correlated with definite
spin states of particle 1, as are definite states of the measuring device mB
with definite spin states of particle 2. But since all of the outcomes of the
measurements are realised, there is no question of the obtaining of one definite
value of spin at one side forcing the anti-correlated value of spin to be obtained
at the far side. Both sets of values become realised, relative to different states
of the apparatus (and relative to subsequent observers if they are introduced
into the model)—as we put it before:
There is, as it were, no dash to ensure agreement between the two
sides to be a source of non-locality and potentially give rise to prob-
lems with Lorentz covariance.(?)
However, it is important to note that following the measurements at A and
B, not only does each measured system have a definite spin state relative to
the indicator state of the device that has measured it, but the systems and
measuring apparatuses in each region (e.g. system 1 and apparatus mA in A)
have definite spin and indicator states relative to definite spin and indicator
states of the system and apparatus in the other region (e.g. 2,mB in B). That
is, following the two local measurements, from the point of view of the systems
in one region, the states of the systems in the far region correspond to a definite,
in fact perfectly anti-correlated, measurement outcome. This is in contrast to
the general case of non-parallel spin measurements at A and B, as we shall see
in a moment.
In this parallel-settings, EPR, case we have a deterministic explanation of
how the perfect (anti-)correlations come about. Given the initial state that was
prepared, and given the measurements that were going to be performed, it was
always going to be the case that a spin-up outome for system 1 would be cor-
related with a spin-down outcome for system 2 and vice versa, once both sets
of local measurements were completed. The perfect (anti-) correlations unfold
deterministically from the initial entangled state given the local measurement
interactions in regions A and B respectively. There is no puzzle here about how
independent, intrinsically stochastic processes taking place in spacelike sepa-
rated regions could nonetheless end up being correlated, since the evolution,
and explanation of how the correlations come about, is purely deterministic: up
for system 1 was always going to be correlated with down for system 2, as was
down for system 1 with up for system 2, both cases (of course) being superposed
in the final state.33
33Note that given that both possible outcomes for each spin measurements obtain simul-
taneously in the final state, the Bell–Suppes–Zanotti argument that any local theory which
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9.1.2 Case 2: Non-aligned measurements (Bell)
As we have already noted, one of the plethora of good points in ? is of course
that the parallel-settings case is in an important sense not very interesting. For
this restricted class of measurement settings, Bell readily provided a local (deter-
ministic) hidden variable model. Moreover, from a practical point of view, cases
in which one has managed exactly to align one’s Stern-Gerlach magnets with
one’s colleagues’ way over yonder will form a set of measure zero. For both these
reasons, then, it is important to consider what happens in the general case—
as in the set-up required to derive Bell’s inequalities—where the measurement
angles are not aligned.
In this case we may write the initial state as
|↑〉A 1√2
(|↑〉1|↓〉2 − |↓〉1|↑〉2)|↑θ〉B , (7)
where we have assumed a relative angle θ between the directions of measure-
ment. If we write | ↑〉 = α| ↑θ〉+β| ↓θ〉, | ↓〉 = α′| ↑θ〉+β′| ↓θ〉, we can express
this joint state as:
|↑〉A 1√2
[
|↑〉1
(
α|↑θ〉2+β|↓θ〉2
)− |↓〉1(α′|↑θ〉2+β′|↓θ〉2)] |↑θ〉B . (8)
We can then see that following the measurements at A and B (the time order
of these two measurements is again immaterial, of course), we will have
1√
2
[
|↑〉A|↑〉1
(
α|↑θ〉2|↑θ〉B + β|↓θ〉2|↓θ〉B
)
− |↓〉A|↓〉1
(
α′|↑θ〉2|↑θ〉B + β′|↓θ〉2|↓θ〉B
)]
.
(9)
Here, relative to states representing a definite outcome of measurement in region
A, there is no definite outcome in B; system 2 and apparatus mB are just
entangled, with no definite spin and indicator states. Similarly, from the point
of view of definite spin and indicator states of 2 and mB (a definite outcome in
region B), there is no definite outcome of measurement in region A.
For non-parallel spin measurements, then, unlike the parallel case, there
needs to be a third measurement (or measurement-like interaction), comparing
(effectively) the outcomes from A and B, in order to make definite spin and
indicator states from one side definite relative to definite spin and indicator
states from the other. Thus systems from A and B have to be brought (or
come) together and a joint measurement be performed (or a measurement-like
interaction take place), leading to a state like:
1√
2
[
α|↑〉A|↑〉1|↑θ〉2|↑θ〉B |↑↑〉C + β|↑〉A|↑〉1|↓θ〉2|↓θ〉B |↑↓〉C
− α′|↓〉A|↓〉1|↑θ〉2|↑θ〉B |↓↑〉C − β′|↓〉A|↓〉1|↓θ〉2|↓θ〉B |↓↓〉C
]
, (10)
predicts perfect (anti-)correlations must collapse into the kind of deterministic theory Bell
considered in his (1964), does not obtain. Everett is a deterministic theory, but it does not
belong to the class of deterministic completions of quantum mechanics considered in ?, since
it is also a probabilistic (stochastic) theory—at the emergent level at which measurement
outcomes are part of the story.
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where the states |↑↑〉C etc. are the indicator states of the comparing apparatus.
Following this third measurement-interaction, which can only take place in the
overlap of the future light cones of the measurements at A and B, a definite
outcome for the spin measurement in one region finally obtains, relative to
a definite outcome for the measurement in the other. That is, we can only
think of the correlations between measurement outcomes on the two sides of
the experiment actually obtaining in the overlap of the future light-cones of the
measurement events—they do not obtain before then and—a fortiori— they do
not obtain instantaneously. On each side locally there are definite measurement
outcomes (superposed with one another) as soon as each local measurement is
complete, but there is no correlation between the measurement outcomes on the
two sides until later on, when a suitable entangling operation between systems
from the two regions A and B can take place.
It is important to note what this means for how probability statements
derived from the Born rule for joint measurements on spacelike separated sys-
tems should be understood in this context. Given the initial entangled singlet
state, we can make formal statements about what the probability distribution
over joint measurement outcomes for spacelike separated measurements is. In
general these joint-probabilities will be non-trivial and in fact Bell-inequality
violating. But physically, there is nothing for such joint probabilities to be joint
probabilities of until one reaches the overlap region of the future light-cones of
the measurement events, since it is only in this overlap region that measurement-
outcomes for the individual measurements on either side can become definite
with respect to one another, in general. Before then, the joint probabilities are
only formal statements, regarding what one would expect to see, were one to
compare the results of measurements on the two sides. This state of affairs does
much to take the sting out of the randomness problem mentioned above in Sec-
tion ??: the original separated measurement events are neither fundamentally
random, nor are they correlated in the straightforward sense of classical physics.
9.2 The role of non-separability
Is there anything left to be explained? Arguably yes: it is the non-trivial fact
that the correlations will be found to obtain in the future, given a future com-
parison measurement.
So far we have primarly emphasised the role of the failure of uniqueness for
measurement outcomes in permitting Everettian quantum mechanics to produce
EPR and Bell correlations without any action-at-a-distance, and we have seen in
some detail how in fact these correlations can be explained as arising following
a local dynamics from the initial entangled state. Earlier, however, we noted
that non-separability was also an important part of the explanation of how
Everett could provide a local story for EPR and Bell correlations. We shall
expand on this now, and in so-doing return to the point raised above that it may
not be entirely obvious whether or how uniqueness of outcomes features as an
assumption in Bell’s reasoning from 1976 on, once the idea of local causality—or
rather its formulation in terms of factorisability—was introduced.
One obvious point to make straightaway is that if the initial pure state of
the two spins was not entangled, i.e., was separable, then there could not be any
correlation between the spin-measurements on the two sides of the experiment,
let alone Bell-inequality violating ones. (This point holds in more general the-
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ories than quantum mechanics also.) But more deeply what is going on is that
non-separability allows there to be facts about the relations between spatially
separated systems which go above and beyond—are not determined by—the
intrinsic (i.e., locally defined) properties of those systems individually. In par-
ticular, there can be facts about how things in spatial region A will be correlated
with (related to) things in spatial region B, without its being the case that how
things are in A and how things are in B fix these relations.34
In the Bell-experiment with spins we have just discussed, if one only had
failure of uniqueness of outcomes for the measurements on each side, in an
otherwise separable theory, then there could obtain no non-trivial correlations
between the outcomes of the measurements. Everettian quantum mechanics
exploits both non-uniqueness of outcomes and non-separability in accounting
for EPR and Bell correlations without action-at-a-distance. In fact, it is the
particular way that non-separability features in the theory which entails non-
uniqueness for the measurement outcomes.35
Now: the Everett interpretation shows that a theory can be local in the
sense of satisfying no-action-at-a-distance, whilst failing to be locally causal:
it violates the factorisability condition, or equivalently, the condition in terms
of the probabilities attached to local beables in a given spacetime region being
independent of goings-on in spacelike regions, once the state of the past light-
cone of that region is sufficiently specified. What, then, went wrong with Bell’s
formulation of local causality, as an expression of locality? It is not perspicuous,
at least to us, why the mere failure of uniqueness of measurement outcomes
should make local causality—as Bell formulated it mathematically—inapposite
as an expression of a principle of locality. So there is something more to be said,
here. In our view what needs to be said is that, at root, it is moving to the
context of non-separable theories which makes Bell’s mathematically formulated
conditions fail properly to capture his intuitive notions of locality.36
To substantiate this thought we need to return to Reichenbach’s principle of
the common cause. Recall that in order to move from Bell’s informal statement
of local causality—that the proximate causes of events should be nearby them,
and causal chains leading up to these events should lie on or within their past
light-cones—to its mathematical formulation in terms of factorisability or equiv-
alently in terms of screening-off, something like Reichenbach’s principle needs to
be appealed to: statistical correlations between events must be explained either
by direct causal links between them, or in terms of a Reichenbachian common-
cause in the past. With such a principle in place we can connect mathematical
statements in terms of probabilities to physical claims about causal links—and
thereby to claims about action-at-a-distance. However, once we move to a sit-
uation where our theory can be non-separable, the common cause principle
is unnatural and unmotivated.37 This is for a very simple reason: in a non-
34Some early explorations of this idea in the context of Bell’s theorem include ??, ??, ?,
??, and ???.
35We leave it as an open question whether or not in any non-separable theory which is
dynamically local, but violates local causality, uniqueness of measurement outcomes fails.
36In making this claim we are thereby taking issue with some of the conclusions of the
otherwise splendid discussion of ?. We will expand on our disagreement with Henson in full
on another occasion.
37? argue that we need not see Bell’s mathematical conditions as resting on Reichenbach’s
principle, but on the notions of locality, causality and statistical sufficiency. In our view their
analysis in terms of statistical sufficiency would also be uncompelling in the context of non-
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separable theory there is a further way in which correlations can be explained
which Reichenbach’s stipulations miss out: correlations between systems (e.g.,
the fact that certain correlations between measurement outcomes will be found
to obtain in the future) can be explained directly by irreducible relational prop-
erties holding between the systems, relational properties themselves which can
be further explained in dynamical terms as arising under local dynamics from
a previous non-separable state for the total system. Which is precisely what
happens in the Everettian context, for example.
In sum, we can see Bell’s mathematical formulation(s) of the intuitive idea of
local causality as instantiating Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause38 as
applied in the case of measurements on systems in spacelike separated regions,
where we are assuming the standard (or naive) conception of what constraints
relativity imposes on causal processes. It may be that Reichenbach’s principle is
plausible enough when one considers separable theories, but it is unacceptable
when one considers non-separable theories. It is therefore, at the most straight-
forward level, simply because Reichenbach’s principle is not apt for worlds which
may be non-separable that Bell’s formal statements of local causality go wrong,
and that there can be theories such as Everett’s which are not locally causal,
but which are local, in the sense that they involve no action-at-a-distance.
We noted at the end of Section ?? that Bell appeared to sound a note of
despair at the end of Nouvelle Cuisine when contemplating the prospect that
local causality might not turn out to be an adequate statement of locality in
physics. In particular he worried that should his formulations of local causality
not be apt and that we had instead to settle for some other statement of lo-
cality (such as no-signalling) which would allow the existence of Bell-inequality
violating correlations whilst one’s theory counted as fully local, then we would
have ‘lost the idea that correlations can be explained’ to quote him again. And
this would indeed seem a worrying thing. But it seems to us, at least, that Bell
need not have cause to despair in the circumstances which we have sketched.
In our view, correlations which violate factorisability, whilst yet arising from a
dynamically local theory, need not be condemned to be unexplainable: we just
need to free ourselves from a Reichenbachian-common-cause straightjacket of
what suitable explanation could be. Put another way, we can all actually fully
agree with the most basic sentiment which commentators draw from Reichen-
bach, namely that correlations should be explainable, whilst disagreeing with
his specific formulation of what causal explanation (or maybe just explanation)
in terms of factors in the past must be like.39 Specifically, it need not be the
case that the factor in the past should be some classical random variable which
screens-off the correlations. A perfectly acceptable, non-equivalent, alternative
form of explanation of correlations in terms of factors in the past would seem
to be in terms of the evolution of a later non-separable state from an earlier
non-separable state. We saw an instance of this, of course, in the Everettian
separable theories, for much the same reasons as Reichenbach’s principle is. Again, we leave
a detailed development of this claim to another forum.
38Modulo the historical subtleties noted earlier about whether in Reichenbach’s own setting
the principle should really be thought to apply at the micro-level at all.
39Accordingly, we commend the approach of ? who explicitly separate Reichenbach’s princi-
ple into two components: First that correlations should be causally explicable either by direct
interaction or common cause in the past; Second that explanation by common cause in the
past takes the particular form that Reichenbach imposed. One can maintain the first idea
whilst varying the second.
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case earlier. The general story as to how a non-separable theory can locally
explain Bell-inequality violating correlations would be that the correlations are
entailed by some suitable non-separable joint state. And if one has a detailed
story of the contents of one’s local and non-separable theory (i.e., a detailed
specification of its kinematics and dynamics—including measurement theory)
then one will have a perfectly good explanation of how this comes about. One’s
explanation will be in terms of how that particular non-separable joint-state
evolved out of some previous (generally) non-separable state.40
9.3 Maudlin’s challenge
We have sought to explain how the Everett interpretation provides one concrete
example illustrating that Bell’s mathematical, probabilistic, formulation of local
causality does, as he feared it might, fail adequately to capture the notion of
locality. An important challenge to a conclusion of this kind is presented in
characteristically trenchant and pithy form by ? however, to which we must
now turn.
Maudlin argues that:
Because the many worlds interpretation fails to make The Predic-
tions [a subset of the predictions of standard quantum theory], Bell’s
theorem has nothing to say about it. ... And reciprocally, the exis-
tence of the many worlds interpretation can in principle shed no light
on Bell’s reasoning because it falls outside the scope of his concerns.
(?, §III)
We will consider these claims in turn.
The first thing Maudlin includes in ‘The Predictions’ is the claim that mea-
surements (of spin, for the EPR–Bohm experiment we have been considering)
have unique outcomes, where ‘Born’s rule provides the means of calculating
the probability of each of the...outcomes.’ (ibid.). The further elements are
the prediction of perfect EPR correlations for parallel measurements, and the
prediction of Bell-inequality violating correlations for certain specific choices of
non-aligned measurements. It is because he sees uniqueness of measurement
outcomes as necessary conditions for the further predictions of EPR and Bell
correlations to have any content that Maudlin believes the Everett interpreta-
tion gets into trouble:
If every experiment carried out on particle 1 yields both [possible
outcomes] ... and every experiment carried out on particle 2 yields
both [possible outcomes], what can it mean to say that the outcomes
on the two sides are always correlated or always anticorrelated [as
in the EPR–Bohm scenario] or agree only [some percentage] ... of
the time [as in the EPR–Bell scenario]? For such claims to have
any content, particular results on one side must be associated with
particular results on the other so that the terms ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’
make sense. (?, §III)
40Thus we offer a picture in terms of the fundamental states of a theory and their
dynamical—law-governed—evolution. Is this a causal form of explanation? If it is thought
not, to our minds it is not clear that that matters. It is certainly physical explanation by one
gold standard.
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The first thing to note is that from the point of view which we have been en-
tertaining, it is simply question-begging to include ‘uniqueness of measurement
outcomes’ amongst the predictions of standard quantum theory. For what, after
all, even is standard quantum theory? Arguably there is no such thing—there
is a standard quantum algorithm, which experimentalists know how to apply to
get a good fit to experiment, and where in particular they find that the Born
rule gives an excellent fit to the results they see. But anything beyond this
is up for grabs, and may be understood differently in different interpretations
(or different theories) offered to underpin the success of the standard quantum
algorithm. In particular, from an Everettian point of view, the observation of
unique outcomes of measurements doesn’t at all entail uniqueness of the out-
comes in the complete state of the world. For the Everettian, the success of the
standard quantum algorithm can be guaranteed without requiring the latter
form of uniqueness.
But even if uniqueness of measurement outcomes can’t be thought to be
part of the predictions of standard quantum theory (as opposed to being part
of the presuppositions in various standard approaches to the theory) it might
even so—as Maudlin alleges—be a necessary condition for making sense of the
prediction of correlations, for the reasons Maudlin states above. We disagree,
however.
First return to the Everettian treatment of perfect EPR correlations as we
described above (Section ??). Here we saw how the standard, local, unitary
dynamics would lead deterministically to the case in which up on one side of
the experiment was correlated with down on the other, and vice versa. Relative
to definite results on one side of the experiment, there are definite results on
the other. It is quite clear what it means for the measurement results always
to be correlated in this case, notwithstanding the fact that both options for
the correlated outcomes are superposed together in the overall final entangled
state. Note for future reference that in this case we do not have to appeal to
the Born rule to understand the prediction that the results on the two sides of
the experiment will be perfectly correlated with one another.
Second, we return to our treatment of the non-aligned, Bell, case (Sec-
tion ??). Here one will need to appeal to the Born rule in order to predict
that there are correlations, but importantly, as we described, it is only in the
overlap of the future light-cones of the measurement events, given a suitable
comparison interaction between systems from the two sides, that measurement
outcomes from one side will become definite relative to measurement outcomes
from the other. Thus what is required to make sense of the prediction of Bell
correlations is that a measurement in the overlap of the future light-cones of
the initial measurement events, one which compares locally, at a point, records
of the outcomes from the two regions A and B where the initial measurements
took place, should give a suitable probability distribution for what the results of
that local comparison will be. In the non-aligned case, that ‘particular results
on one side [are] associated with particular results on the other’ comes about
subsequent to the intial measurements being made, and is brought about by
their being a suitable later comparison interaction. It is after this further in-
teraction that ‘the terms “agree” and “disagree” make sense’ as applied to the
results of the earlier measurements.
It is possible that one might remain unsatisfied by this. After all, one might
say that—at least for the Bell-correlations case, if not the EPR—we have had
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to appeal to the Born rule, and perhaps the real thrust of the worry coming
from non-uniqueness of measurement outcomes is that sense can’t be made
of how the Born rule could apply to govern the probabilities of outcomes of
measurements, if all the outcomes occur. This, of course, is a long-standing
and respectable objection to the Everett interpretation, but notice that there
is nothing specific about EPR or Bell correlations in this. Given our analysis,
the case of alleged difficulty in predicting Bell correlations has been reduced to
the case of making sense of probability in Everett for local measurements. And
in our view, this amounts to reduction to—plausibly—a previously solved case
(see particularly the work of Saunders, Deutsch, Wallace and Greaves).41 Even
if one remains agnostic about whether or not Everett does give an adequate
account of probability for local measurements, then our point is simply that in
so far as Everett is a player at all as a viable interpretation of quantum theory,
it provides a concrete counterexample to Bell’s probabilistic formulation of local
causality. (In our view, of course, Everett is a very significant player.)42
In effect we have already stated our response to Maudlin’s reciprocal claim
that ‘the existence of the many worlds interpretation can shed no light on Bell’s
reasoning because it falls outside the scope of his concerns’. On the contrary.
Once it is recognised that the uniqueness of measurement outcomes is question-
begging if assumed to be a requirement on there being well-formed theories
which make probabilistic predictions for the results of measurements in various
spacetime regions, Everett plainly falls within the scope of Bell’s post-1976 rea-
soning and is entirely germane to the adequacy of his probabilistic formulation
of local causality. In 1986 Bell noted:
The ‘many world interpretation’ seems to me an extrava-
gant[...]hypothesis[...]And yet...It may have something distinctive to
say in connection with the ‘Einstein Podolsky Rosen puzzle’ (?)
We think he was dead right on this last point.
10 Conclusions
We have seen that there was a very significant shift in Bell’s notion of nonlocality
between 1964 and 1976, a shift that occurred in parallel with his thinking moving
away from focussing on completions of quantum mechanics in the spirit of EPR.
Crucially, violating the 1964 locality condition gives rise to action-at-a-distance,
whereas violating local causality of 1976 need not. We have noted, moreover,
that as Bell’s thinking developed, he came more and more to recognise that there
need be no straightforward conflict between violation of either of his locality
conditions and the demands of relativity.
In our discussion of locality in the Everett interpretation we have sought
to provide a constructive example illustrating precisely how a theory can be
dynamically local, whilst violating local causality; and we emphasised the in-
terconnected roles of the failure of uniqueness of measurement outcomes and
41?, ?, ???, ? and ?, Part II.
42There is a final worry which might be motivating Maudlin, in that he may find it obscure
how the Everettian story about the emergence of determinate–but nonetheless superposed—
measurement outcomes and experiences of the everyday world is supposed to work. But again
this is just a general objection to Everett, and one on which there has been a great deal of
persuasive work, see again ? and ? for the state of the art.
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of non-separability in achieving this. We think that Bell was right to have
had doubts in 1990 regarding whether he had managed, in his mathematical,
probabilistic, statements of local causality adequately to capture the concept of
locality. But we have suggested that even if local causality is rejected as the
expression of locality, it need not follow that one is doomed to having to put
up with unexplained correlations, as Bell feared one might be. For as we have
explained, non-separable theories allow additional ways in which correlations
can be causally explained without action-at-a-distance.
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